COURT VERSUS LEGISLATURE
(The Socio-Politics of Malapportionment)
Gus Ty,.m*
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Baker v.Carr contains
a double irony.' First, the Supreme Court-that branch of government traditionally
most removed from popular control-appears as tribune of the people, demanding
a fuller voice for democracy. Second, the state legislature-that branch of government traditionally most responsive to popular control-appears as the tyrant, denying
a full and fair voice to the citizenry. This reversal of historic roles reveals a great
deal about the accumulated social and political pressures that lie behind the Court's
Tennessee decision and that may profoundly affect the contours of American
government in the future.
The local legislature was historically the people's voice, serving in colonial
America as goad and check on the governor. The friction between assembly and
governor fired and foreshadowed the mounting hostility between colony and
motherland that flared in the American Revolution. When the liberated colonies
and then the United States composed their separate and common constitutions they
set up legislative assemblies to guard the interests of the "people" against executive
encroachment.
The elected assembly, as personification of the citizenry, is an image deeply engraved in the preambles and apportionment language of our present state constitutions. The New York State Constitution provides that senatorial districts shall
"contain as nearly as may be an equal number of citizen inhabitants" 2 and that the
The Louisiana
Assembly shall be apportioned on a citizen population basis
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shall be equal and uniform and shall be based upon population, and such basis of
representation shall not be changed by constitutional amendments."' In Florida,
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'In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88 (x962.), Justice Brennan, speaking for six members of the
Supreme Court, found: "This civil action was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to redress the
alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights. The complaint, alleging that by means of a 19ox
statute of Tennessee apportioning the members of the General Assembly among the State's 95 counties,
'these plaintiffs and others similarly situated, are denied the equal protection of the laws accorded them
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by virtue of the debasement of
their votes,' was dismissed by a three-judge court convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 in the Middle
District of Tennessee. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter and also that
no claim was stated upon which relief could be granted. 179 F. Supp. 824. We noted probable
jurisdiction of the appeal. 364 U.S. 898. We hold that the dismissal was error, and remand the cause
to the District Court for trial and further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
' LA. CoNsr. art. III, §2.
Sid. § 5.
'N.Y. CoNsr. art. III, § 4.
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TABLE I
PERCENT o STATE's POPULAION REPRESENTED BY MAJORITY OF MEMBEs
IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS

State

Lower House

Connecticut ................
9.6%
California ..................
44.7
Nevada ....................
28.8
Vermont ...................
12.6
Rhode Island ...............
34.2
Maryland ..................
27.6
New Jersey .................
44.0
Florida.....................
17.2
Montana ...................
40.8
Indiana ....................
41.5
Arizona ...................
no info.
Delaware ...................
19.4
New Mexico ................
35.7
Oregon.....................
29.2
Kansas ....................
22.6
Missouri ...................
23.7
Georgia ....................
26.3
South Carolina ..............
46.7
Utah ......................
39.0
Alabama ...................
27.2
Wyoming ..................
39.9
Idaho ......................
29.3
Illinois .....................
46.0
Oklahoma ..................
33.4
Tennessee ..................
30.1
North Carolina ..............
30.2
Minnesota ..................
31.6
Louisiana ...................
31.9
Michigan ...................
42.3
Mississippi .................
32.7
Washington .................
38.9
Colorado ...................
34.7
North Dakota ..............
39.0
Pennsylvania ...............
41.6
Texas ......................
39.9
Indiana ....................
37.0
New York ..................
37.1
37.4
New Hampshire .............
Arkansas ...................
37.5
Kentucky..................
37.6
South Dakota ...............
38.7
West Virginia ...............
38.9
Wisconsin .................
38.9
Minnesota .................
39.1
Nebraska ...............
unicameral
Massachusetts ..............
42.2
Oregon .....................
45.4
43.7
Virginia ....................

Senate
36.5%
11.9
12.4
45.7
13.5
15.5
17.0
17.7
18.4
19.1
19.3
22.7
20.1
20.7
33.7
47.4
26.9
26.6
26.8
28.3
28.8
33.9
29.4
29.5
33.3
40.1
35.9
36.0
32.3
34.6
35.4
36.1
35.4
35.4
36.8
39.3
40.9
44.8
47.0
45.2
40.9
45.7
47.5
39.7
41.9
48.8
42.2
43.9

Source: Based on tables in Dauer & Kelsay, Un,eprseatire Sttes, 44 NAT. Music. Rtv. 571 (1955); corrected figures
appear in

45 id. 198 (1056).

the constitution calls for senatorial districts "as nearly equal in population as
practicable."5 In Michigan, a constitutional amendment of 1952 provided for house
seats to contain "as nearly as may be an equal number of inhabitants."' In Georgia,
where the county unit system prevails, the constitution states that "all government,
' FLA. Co~sT. art. III, § 3.

* MicH. CoNsr. art. V, § 2.
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of right, originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted
solely for the good of the people." 7
In thirty-three states, the senate is apportioned on the basis of people-population,
or adults over 21, or citizens, or qualified electors. In forty-one states, the house
uses a similar base. The unicameral legislature of Nebraska rests on a population
basis.8

The myth of the state legislature as champion of the people is preserved not
only in the formal language of the constitutions, but also in the popular belief. In
political debate, to "leave it to the states" is viewed as synonymous with "leave it to
the folks back home." Yet, in reality, there is no branch of American governmentbe it state executive, federal legislature or executive, or the courts-more structurally
unrepresentative of the American people than the state legislature.
In Connecticut's Lower House, legislators from districts containing 9.6 per cent
of the total population of the state can compose an absolute majority of the state
legislature; in the California Senate, a group speaking for 11.9 per cent of the state
population is a majority; in the Nevada Senate, a 124 per cent group rules; in the
Vermont Lower House, a 2.6 per cent group dominates. Table one shows the
percentage of a state's population that can, through its legislators, compose a majority
in each body.
Among the states where minorities control legislatures are included those where
the constitutional decree is representation based on "people." The distortion between
written intent and actual practice arises from modifying provisions of the selfsame
constitutions that twist the general purpose into its opposite, from the capricious
actions of state legislatures, and from the failure of legislatures to comply with
their own constitutions.
The ratio of most populous to least populous districts further underscores the
unrepresentative character of our state legislatures, as will be seen from table two.
Malapportionment in state legislatures is usually attributed to the political tug of
war between urban and rural areas, especially as the latter tried to hold on to power
against the advance of the cities in the twentieth century. Actually, the problem
predates the modern farm-versus-town conflict, reaching all the way back to the
colonial period.
"In most colonies," note Morison and Commager, "representation was so apportioned as to favor the older settled regions."9
This favoring of the older settled regions effectively put colonial power in the
hands of a dominant aristocracy, often residing in cities where the lower classes were
without a vote. Through limited franchise and inflated representation, the colonial
elite could be certain of political power over the city poor and the landed yeomanry.
8"GA.

CONST. art. I, § 1.

INDEx DIGST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

'959).

(Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University,

'r-SAmnuL E. MoiusoN & HENRY S. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
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TABLEII
RATIO O1 POPULATION OF MOST POPULOUS TO LEAST POPULOUS
DisTicT IN EA CH LEGisLAv CHrmBEn, 1960*
Key:

State & Chamber
New Hampshire, LH ............

Vermont, LH...................
Connecticut, LH ................
California, S ....................

Nevada, S .....................
Rhode Island, S ................
New Mexico, S .................
Florida, LH ....................
Idaho, S..................
Georgia, LH ....................

Florida, S ......................
Montana, S ....................
Arizona, S .....................

Georgia, S .....................
Alabama, S...............
Rhode Island, I_ ...............
Delaware, LH ..................
Kansas, LH ....................
Maryland, S ....................
Nevada, LH....................
Pennsylvania, LH ...............
Utah, LH ......................
Oklahoma, S ...................
Idaho, LH .....................
South Carolina, S ...............
Tennessee, LH .............
Missouri, LH ...................
Kansas, S ......................
North Carolina, LH .............
New Jersey, S ..................
Iowa, LI ......................
Louisiana, LH ..................
Delaware, S ....................
Mississippi, LH .................
Alabama, LH ...................
New Mexico, LI ...............
Iowa, S ........................
New York, LH .................

Ohio, LH ......................
Oklahoma, LH .................
Montana, LII ..................
Massachusetts, LH ..............
Minnesota, LH .................
Maryland, II ..................
M ichigan, S ....................
Alaska, S ......................
Pennsylvania, S ................
North Dakota, S ................
Wyoming, S ....................
Illinois, S .....................

S=Senate

LH =Lower House

Ratio

State & Chamber

Ratio

1,081.3 to 1
987.0 to 1

Texas, S ......................
West Virginia, LH .............
M ississippi, S .................
Colorado, LH............
Louisiana, S ..................
North Dakota, LH ............
Colorado, S ...................
Washington, S ................
Virginia, LH ..................
Utah, S.................
Texas, LI ....................
Connecticut, S ................
Maine, LH ...................
Arkansas, LH .................
Alaska, LH ...................
Vermont, S..............
California, LH............
Kentucky, LI ................
Tennessee, S ..................
North Carolina, S .............
Hawaii, S...............
Minnesota, S .................
South Dakota, S ..............
Virginia, S ....................
Indiana, LH ..................
Arizona, LH ..................
South Dakota, LH ............
Washington, LH ..............
Indiana, S...............
New York, S ..................
Michigan, LH.................
Wisconsin, LH ................
Illinois, LH ...................
Oregon, S ....................
Wyoming, LH ................
West Virginia, S ...............
South Carolina, LH ............
New Jersey, LH ...............
Oregon,LH ...................
New Hampshire, S ............
Kentucky, S ..................
Wisconsin, S ..................
M issouri, S ...................
Maine, S................
Nebraska (unicameral) .........
Arkansas, S ...................
Massachusetts, S ..............
Hawaii, LH ...................
Ohio, S .......................

9.4 to 1
9.0to 1

424.5 to 1
422.5 to 1
223.6 to 1
141.0 to 1
139.9 to 1
108.7 to 1
102.1 to 1
98.8 to 1
98.0 to 1
88.4 to 1
85.8 to 1
42.6 to 1
41.2 to 1
39.0 to 1
35.4 to 1
33.2 to 1
31.8 to 1
31.4 to 1
31.1 to 1
27.8
to 1
2
6.4 to 1
25.5 to 1
25.1 to 1
23.0 to 1
22.2 to 1
21.3 to 1
19.0 to 1
19.0 to 1
17.8 to 1
17.4 to 1
16.8 to 1
16.7 to 1
15.6 to 1
15.5 to 1
15.0 to 1
14.8 to 1
14.5 to 1
14.0 to 1
14.0 to 1
13.9 to 1
13.3 to 1
12.5 to 1
12.4 to 1
10.8 to 1
10.7 to 1
9.9 to 1
9.8to 1
9.4 to 1

* Where districts are represented by more than one legislator, ratio is that of mest to least populatien per legislator.
Source: PAm T. DAVm & RAIwsa E=amBEra, DEzvW.a ioN or mm URBT AxDSuimmeaai VoT 1 (1961).

8.8
8.1
8.0
7.5
7.3
7.3
7.1

to 1
tel
to 1
tol
to 1
to 1
to 1

6.9 to 1

6.7 to 1
6.7 to 1
6.6 to 1

6.4to 1
6.4to 1
6.4to 1

6.2to
6.0 to
6.0to
6.0 to

1
1
1
1

5.9 to 1

5.8 tol
5.8 to 1
5.5 tol
5.4to 1

5.3 tol
4.7 to 1
4.6 to 1

4.4to
4.0 to
4.0 to
3.9 to

1
1
1
1

3.6 to 1

3.5 to 1
3.4to 1
3.4to 1

3.1 to 1
3.0 to 1
3.0 to 1

3.0 to 1
2.9 to 1
2.8to 1

2.8to1
2.8 to 1
2.7 to 1

2.3 to 1
2.3 to 1
2.2to 1

2.2 to 1
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As a result, .... in no colony were they [the lower class] fairly represented in the
legislature."1
In North Carolina, "a small group of seaboard gentry," a hopelessly small numerical minority, "controlled four-fifths of the representation: the coastal counties sent
five members each to the legislature, while the inland counties had two apiece."11
In Pennsylvania, the Quaker aristocracy gave the three Delaware river counties eight
representatives each while the five western counties had only eleven representatives
altogether. "If representation had been based either on population or on the number
of taxables, the figures would have been reversed."1
In his Notes on Virginia, Thomas Jefferson found fault with the constitution of
his own state of Virginia on two scores: suffrage and representation. "Among those
who share the representation," he wrote, "the shares are very unequal. Thus the
county of Warwick, with one hundred fighting men, has an equal representation
with the county of Loudon, which has one thousand seven hundred and forty-six.
So that every man in Warwick has as much influence in the government as seventeen
in Loudon."' 3
In a letter to Governor William King of Maine, Jefferson praised the constitution
in every respect "except that of Representation." He disapproved the granting of
one seat to each town regardless of size. "Equal representation is so fundamental a
principle . . . ," insisted Jefferson, "that no prejudices can justify its violation because
the prejudices themselves cannot be justified."' 4
In the ferment of the Revolutionary period, malapportionment in favor of the
colonial aristocracy was challenged. In 1776, the year the Declaration of Independence was signed, Pennsylvania frontiersmen, armed with whatever weapons they
could grab, forced a reapportionment in the state constitution, declaring that "representation in proportion to the number of taxable inhabitants is the only principle
which can at all times secure liberty, and make the voice of a majority of the people
the law of the land."' 5
The very next year, a New England group was challenging the idea of each
town sending at least one delegate to the legislature, regardless of the town's size.
The practice might have been acceptable when all towns were of about equal size,
when they were all more or less alike and with parallel interests, and when they were
governed locally and hardly felt the weight of the colony or state. However, as
towns became disparate in size, as their interests clashed, as they felt the weight of
the state in taxes, in money policies, in the military levy, there were protests against
unequal representation. In 1777, a group protested against the existing system of
representation in Massachusetts. "Let the representatives be apportioned among
"' ld. at x75.
" ld. at X7o.
10 ibid.
is2 THE WRITINGs

oF THOmAS JEFFERSON

x6o-6ri (Library ed. 1903), quoted in GonnoN E. BAYER,

RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITIC L PowER 7 (1955).

"Papers in Archives of the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, quoted in de Grazia,
General Theory of Apportionment, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 256, 261 (1952); see also Robert deVore,
"Gallery Glimpses," Washington Post, April 4, 1943, P. 48.
11 B~xnmR, op. cit. supra note 13, at 7-1o.
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the respective counties, in proportion to the number of their freemen," they demanded.'

In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the concept of "proportionate representation" was given a high rank among the basic ideas for this huge territory west of

the Appalachians :16 "The inhabitants of said territory shall always be entitled to the
benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury; of a proportionate
representation of the people in the legislature, and of judicial proceedings according
to the course of common law .. ."
The term "proportionate representation" was then used synonymously with
"equal" representation, "proportionate" referring to the concept that a bigger county
should have bigger representation-but that the representation should be based on
population.
The reapportionments effected during this period were the results of political
contests between two propertied groups: those in the older and the newer settlements. The unpropertied in the cities were still out of the contest, without the
right to vote.
Extension of the franchise to the propertyless in the cities posed a new problem
for those vested interests usually identified with conservatism in the United Statesthe problem of a political population base. After the decline of Populism in the
United States, such a base was discovered in the dominantly rural areas of America.
Out of this development arose a new coalition-the alliance between the silk stocking districts of the cities and the rural districts of the countryside-that has been
a primary pillar of political conservatism in America.
The conservative character of rural over-representation is attested in the statements of both friends and foes alike. Seymour Martin Lipset, an opponent of the
system, sees malapportionment as the conservative answer to the extended franchise.
In examining "rotten boroughs-twentieth century style," he writes :17
In a sense, a large part of the American political system may be compared to the
pattern existing in various parts of Europe before World War I. In a number of European
countries middle-class and property owning voters either were given more votes than the
property-less, or were explicitly allowed to elect a large part of the parliament. These

devices, of course, were designed by conservatives to prevent the danger that universal
suffrage would result in leftist parliamentary majorities.
Today in the United States, the shift of population to the large cities is, in effect,
recreating on the level of state government, the favored solution of the European conservatives to the problem of yielding the vote to the property-less. The centers of tradeunion strength, which are also concentrations of Negroes, Jews, Catholics, and others of

recent immigrant stock, and the backbone of economic reform politics, are given much
less representation than are the areas which are the centers of conservatism.
Is ibid.

...
Ordinance of 1787, art. II, in

LAws OF THE NoRTHwEsT TEmrroRy,

x787-x8o2, at 68 (1833).

(Emphasis
added.)
"TLipser, Rotten Boroughs-Twentieth Century Style, i UNiON Rav. 74 (x962).
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In support of the present sytem, Pathfinder-a"town journal" that describes itself
as a voice of the American countryside--once more emphasizes the conservative
character of existing apportionment:' 8
Do you get all steamed tip whefn you read that some left-wing labor union is "putting
pressure" on Congress to pass legislation that would be unsound?
If so, you're using up a lot of energy unnecessarily. For Congress and the state legislatures are in safe hands. They are controlled by the conservative, common-sense people
of "Country-side America"-people who live in places of under io,ooo and on farms.
Dr. Lashley G. Harvey, after a study of practices in many states, concluded that
"large taxpaying interests frequently gain from rural domination and will go to
great lengths to maintain existing apportionments."' 9 In a study of the California
legislature, Dean McHenry found that,20
. .certain business interests in the state have found it easier to make their influence
felt in the legislature through senators from rural areas. Privately owned utilities, banks,
insurance companies and other concerns with crucial legislative programs have discovered
some "cow county" legislators more responsive to their demands and less committed to
contrary points of view on key social and economic questions than are urban representatives.
A former president of the National Association of Real Estate Boards provided
an ideological base for continuing inequality:21
Today the greatest threat to democratic institutions, to the republican form of government, and ultimately to freedom itself, lies in our big cities. They are populated for the
most part with the mass-man, devoid of intelligence, and devoid of civic responsibility.
He talks only about rights and has no conception of responsibilities. He will vote for
anyone who offers him something for nothing. Whether it be subway fares at half-price
or public housing at one-third price .... Our one hope of survival as a free country is
that rural and semi-rural areas still dominate most of the state legislatures through their
representatives and still dominate the House of Representatives at Washington. Our best
hope for the future is to keep it that way.
In northern states, the conservative coalition of city wealth and rural legislator
often expresses itself through the formal organization of the Republican Party.
In southern states, the same coalition expresses itself through the dominant elements
in the Democratic Party:
The significance of the racial aspect of malapportionment has been stressed by V. 0.
Key (a southerner, and professor of government at Harvard University), who observed
in i95o that "by the overrepresentation of rural counties in State legislatures, the whites
of the black belts gain an extremely disproportionate strength in State lawmaking." This

" Who Really Runs America?, unpaged

reprint from Pathfinder, June 1953.

"9 Harvey, Reapportionments of State Legislatures-Legal Requirements, 17 LAw & CONTnM'. PaOn.
364 (1952).
50

McHenry, Urban Versus Rural in California, 35 NAT. MUNse. REv. 350-54, 388 (1946).
August N. Reaner, Legislative Reapportionment in Wisconsin (unpublished M.S. thesis in University
of Wisconsin Library, 1948), quoted in Short, States That Have Not Met Their Constitutional Re.
1

quirements, 17 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 377, 382 (1952).

-COURT vatSus LEGISLATURE

gives excessive weight "to those areas 'in general
the most conservative and in particular
'22
the most irreconcilable on the Negro issue."
More recently, C. Vann Woodward (a southerner and Sterling professor of history at
Yale University) has pointed to malapportionment as a major factor in placing political
control "in the hands of a small and often reactionary oligarchy," thereby "killing . . .
needed social legislation" and fostering
"interference with local public schools and their
23
peaceful adjustment to Federal law."
Roy Harris, a veteran Georgia legislator and president of the White Citizen's
Council, in telling the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) why he favored the
county unit system, stated:24
Now, here's why we're in favor of the county unit system. It keeps down the mobs
of the city that Tom Jefferson talked about. It keeps down these bloc votes. The bloc
vote does not exist in the rural counties or in the smaller cities. And there, it's no ward
politics and no ward organization like there is in the cities. It's the difference between
radical government and conservative government in Georgia.
Another practicing politician, Senator John Rawls of Florida, explaining the
"Pork Chop Gang" in the state legislature in a colloquy with a CBS reporter noted:25
"It's the conservative voice in the Florida state government, the better terminology
being the majority bloc." This "majority," according to Rawls, represented something like "fourteen or fifteen per cent of the population."
The conservative character of the state legislatures has produced a state of mounting frustration among the urban, suburban and industrial majorities in their demands
for social and economic change.
Gordon Baker, in his study of "Rural Versus Urban Political Power," writes:2
The rise of cities in the nineteenth century caused the emergence of a large class of
property-less laborers, whose enfranchisement alarmed men of substance, both rural and
urban. After losing the battles over an extended suffrage, conservatives in a number of
states sought to neutralize its effects by controlling the apportionment of legislative representatives.
Because unequal representation, is, in the first instance, an attempt to preserve the
political forms and forces of the past against the socioeconomic contours of the
present, this violation of democracy produced a necrocracy: a rule of the dead! The
lively voice of a throbbing democracy is stifled by the crabbed claw of the past.
This, says the American Political Science Association in 1954,27
22 1961

UNITaD

STATES

CoMm'N

ON

CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT 114,

quoting V. 0. KEY, SoummuR

PoLITICs
266 (595o). (Emphasis added.)
2
3 1d. at 114, quoting N.Y. Times, June 18, 196I, p. 48.
' "The Beat Majority and the Supreme Court," a television program broadcast over the Columbia
Broadcasting System as part of the "CBS Reports" series, March 29, 1962, transcript, p. io. (Emphasis
added.)
"I1d. at It-i2.
"8 BAxER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 9.
2
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...is one reason why the states have not always been able ... to cope with the greater
problems of an urbanized society, such as housing, metropolitan transportation fares,
price control on foods, social insurance, and community planning beyond city limits.
This inequality, says Dayton D. McKeon in his report to the American Assembly,28 turns out
.. . legislatures that deny or limit municipal home rule, that pass special legislation to
limit the powers of particular cities, that distribute education and welfare funds to the
disadvantage of the cities, [that] ... have shown a neglect or misunderstanding of urban
problems, such as slum clearance, traffic congestion, race relations.
Add to this the vast problems of labor relations, control of consumer goods
monopolies, minimum wages and workmen's compensation, water pollution, conservation of natural resources, suburban development.
McKeon continues:29 "Persons who feel that more is to be feared from governmental action than from stalemate tend to approve the situation. Those who feel that
the problems that beset the states will not solve themselves tend to disapprove it."
With fine impartiality, McKeon has drawn the line: those who think America
is-or should be-static, prefer do-nothing state legislatures, weighted down under
the dead hand of the past; those who know that America is dynamic and demanding cannot rest content with state legislative do-nothingism.
The great majority of Americans who live in the twentieth century-politically
as well as chronologically-finding themselves frustrated by their state legislatures,
embarked on a political odyssey to find an appropriate channel for creative action.
This political wandering-backed by the compelling pressures of millions-has
worked a profound and significant evolution in American political forms-an evolution that has, as in the Tennessee case, reversed the roles of court and legislature
in the United States.
Frustrated by state legislatures, urban dwellers have first turned for guidance
to state governors. The obvious way out is to turn to the governor. His stature
is greater than that of any single legislator and his visibility is higher. He can
be held responsible more easily than a single member of the lower or upper house
in the state capital, and he should be more potent. What is more, the governor is
elected directly by the people with all votes counted equally in all states, except
Georgia. The governor becomes the tribune of the peoplel
This shift of the electorate to the governor is hardly what the early writers of
our state constitutions had in mind when they wrote the documents for their commonwealths. These early Americans feared the Executive Power, especially the
governors, with whom they had some highly unpleasant dealings during the years
of British rule. Early America wanted strong legislatures. But when the legislatures will not act or cannot act at a time when action is needed, the people" McKeon, The Politics of the States, in AmERicAN ASSEMBLY, TmE FowrY-EGHT STATES 72-73

(x955).
20 Ibid.
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through the immemorable process of trial and error-wi turn elsewhere. It is to
the governor that they turn.
One result of this is the stalemate that exists in many states in top state governments: the governor represents one party and the legislature represents another
party; the governor represents one wing of the party (usually the more "modern")
and the legislature represents another wing of the party (usually the more "antique").
Commenting on this in 1956, Karl Bosworth wrote: 30
The results are remarkable in the infrequency with which the party division in the
legislature to be dealt with by the governor came even close to the party division of popular

votes for governor. Ten of these governors found the opposite party in charge in at least
one of the houses. Five of them who won with the respectable figure of fifty-four per cent

of the votes found both houses in the hands of the opposition.
At the present time (1962), the governor's party is the minority in both houses
of the legislature in ten states. In an additional seven, the governor's party is the
minority in at least one house. Thus, in more than a third of the states, the governor
must deal with a legislature in which one or both houses are controlled by the
opposition.3 '
In eight states which elected governors in 196o or i96r, there was a percentage
point difference of ten or more, between the governor's percentage of popular vote
and his party's percentage of seats in at least one house of the legislature. In two
of these states, this was true of both houses.
The conflict between governor and legislature is not accidental. It is almost
inevitable-and apt to become more so should unequal representation continue.
The governor and the legislature are not elected by the same people-really. In
voting for governor, one vote equals one! In voting for legislature, some votes equal
ten and other votes equal one-tenth.
The governor is no saviour, however. He has some power, especially the power
to veto (in states with a gubernatorial veto) and to use his lofty position to arouse
the citizenry. But otherwise, he is frightfully limited. He can pass no laws, and
it is the passage of necessary legislation, not the veto of objectionable legislation, that
is primarily needed if a state is politically to stay abreast of itself. Most governors
cannot even run the administrative branch of their state governments. In their
anxiety to be secure against executive oppression, the constitutional scribes atomized
the Executive Power, so that in many states the lieutenant-governor, the various state
commissioners, and so on down the line are elected separately. The "good" governor
really becomes only a voice too often mocked by his state legislature.
The people, still searching for a solution, stumble on through the governmental
maze. During the last half century, the people have turned to Washington. What
the states could not do, perhaps Washington could do!
"' Bosworth, Latomaking in State Governments, in AmERICA
(195).
"l THE WomDu ALNANAC 70-74 (1962).
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To record the growth of the federal power is not our purpose here. It is well
known. Many factors contributed: the growth of problems that could only be
handled by united action of the nation as a whole; the mounting impact of international affairs; Supreme Court decisions; mammoth grants-in-aid from Washington.
But among these factors must be counted the failure of the states to do right by their
own people!
There is no more authoritative voice on this subject than the Commission for
Intergovernmental Relations, appointed by President Eisenhower. When it was
appointed, one commentator described it as a Commission to "rewrite the Articles
of Confederation," because it seemed to be headed toward a re-proclamation of
"states' rights." The London Economist referred to the Commission as "the
first official reassessment of the American federal system since its foundation in
1787." If there was any "prejudice" at all in this report, it would have been toward
the "states."
Yet in its findings, the Commission had to report that the urban voters would
continue to turn away from the states and to the federal government so long as the
82
present state legislative ineptitude and inaction continue
If states do not give cities their rightful allocation of seats in the legislature, the
tendency will be toward direct Federal-municipal dealings. These began in earnest in the
early days of the depression. There is only one way to avoid this in the future. It is
for the states to take an interest in urban problems, in metropolitan government, in city
needs. If they do not do this, the cities will find a path to Washington as they did
before, and this time it may be permanent, with the ultimate result that there may be a
new government arrangement that will break down the constitutional pattern which has
worked so well up to now.
One result of State neglect of the reapportionment problem is that urban governments
have bypassed the States and made direct cooperative arrangements with the National
Government in such fields as housing and urban development, airports, and defense community facilities. Although necessary in some cases, the multiplication of National-local
relationships tends to weaken the State's proper control over its own policies and its
authority over its own political subdivisions.
Paradoxically enough, the interests of urban areas are often more effectively represented in the National legislature than in their own State legislatures.
The kind of representation that urban America gets in the national legislature is
"fair" only by contrast with the crass under-representation of the cities in the state
bodies. In the United States House of Representatives, an urban majority is converted into a legislative minority by the time-polished techniques of "cracking,
packing, and stacking" districts. The "cracked" district is the huge metropolitan
center, torn apart into separate pieces, each of which is attached to and outvoted by
a surrounding rural hinterland. The "packed" district is the one with a concentrated
urban population containing two or three or even four times as many inhabitants
as a neighboring district. The "stacked" district is the child of the gerrymander,
2

'

COMIMSSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 39-40

(1955).
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a delicately carved creature, resembling nothing more than the partisan and rapacious
3
soul of his political creator
Rochester and Buffalo, New York, and Los Angeles County, California, provide
almost perfect examples of "cracked" districts. The city of Rochester has been
bisected to attach each half to an outlying rural Republican area; Buffalo has been
trimmed at the edges to make certain that this giant city shall not elect more than
one Democrat to Congress. In California, the Republican-controlled i951 legislature
carved the Los Angeles districts so skillfully that, even though Democratic candidates received county-wide majorities in each election from 1954 through i96o, the
Republicans never failed to win fewer than seven of the county's twelve congressional
seats. In 1958, Democrats polled sixty-four per cent of the votes but were nevertheless
able to win in only five of the districts! (California's Democratic-controlled i96i
legislature redrew the boundaries; therefore the coming decade may find the shoe
on the other foot in Los Angeles.)
Atlanta, Memphis, and Indianapolis provide startling examples of "packed" districts. The first is in a congressional district which has a population of 824,ooo in
a state where the average district is 394,000; the second is in a district with a population of 627,000 in a state where the average is 396,000; the third is in a district with
4
a population of 698,ooo in a state where the average is 424,oo00
The finest example of the "stacked" districts may be found in the imaginatively
defiant handiwork of the New York State legislature in carving congressional boundaries for use during the sixties. Graphically the outlines compose a geographic
Rorschach. Politically, a congressional delegation that is now 22 to 2i in favor of the
Democrats will probably become, without any change in the popular vote, a delegation of 25 to i6-perhaps even as much as 26 to 5-in favor of the Republicans. A
similar, although aesthetically more acceptable job, was performed by the Democrats
on the Republicans in California!35
There are congressional districts, within the same state, that are four times and
more larger in population than other districts. Democratic Congressman Lesinski
(part of Detroit and vicinity) represents 8o3,oo souls while his Republican colleague
Bennett from the Upper Peninsula of Michigan represents 177,ooo people. The
congressman from Dallas represents 952,000 people; another Texas congressman has
only 21,ooo constituents. The congressman from Northwest Colorado represents
654,000 people, while the congressman from Western Colorado speaks for 196,ooo.
Table three shows the contrasts in congressional district populations under i962 districting?"
"'A fuller description of the various types of gerrymanders may be found in Tyler, The House of
Un-Representatives (a series), The New Republic, June 2i, 1954, p. 8; id. June 28, 1954, p. 14; id.
July 5, 1954, p. 13.
8

"Cong. Q. Weely Report No. 5, Feb. ",, x962, pp. x6o, 168, 161 respectively.
"Tyler & Wells, Camel Bites Dachshund, The New Republic, Nov. 27, z961, pp. 9-io.
" Figures for states which have redistricted on the basis of the 196o Census are taken from various
issues of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, x961 and early 1962. Figures for states which have
not redistricted are taken from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report No. 5, Feb. 2, 1962, pp. I58-69.
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TABLE III

"

MOST POPULOUS AND LEAST POPULOUS CONGRESSIONAL DIsTRicTs IN EACH STATE,

1962

Ratio of Most
State

Most Populous
District

Michigant ........

802,994

Populous to
Per cent Over Least Populous Per cent Under
Least Populous
State Av.
District
State Av.

951,527
653,954

+ 95.0%
+128.5%
+ 49.1%

177,431

Texast ...........
Colorado ..........

216,371
195,551

-48.1%
-55.4%

'4.5 to 1
4.4 to I
3.3 to 1

Marylandt ........

722,018

+ 86.3%

223,395

-42.4%

3.2 to 1

Obiot ............

726,156

+ 79.5%

236,288

-41.6%

3.1 to 1

Georgia...........
Florida* ..........
Tennessee .........
South Dakota ....
Indiana ...........
Oklahoma .........
Connecticut .......
Wisconsin .........
California* ........
Louisiana .........
Oregon............
South Carolina..
North Carolina*...
Pennsylvania* .....
Utah .............
New Jersey* ......
Kentucky* ........
Arkansas* .........
Virginia ...........
Illinois* ...........
Idaho ............
Montana ..........
Washington .......
Kansas* ..........
West Virginia* ....
Minnesota* .......
Missouri* .........
New York* .......
Iowa* ............
Nebraska .........
New Hampshire...
Maine* ...........
North Dakota* ...
Rhode Island ......

823,680
660,345
627,019
497,669
697,567
552,863
689,555
530,316
591,822
536,029
522,813
531,555
491,461
553,154
572,654
585,586
610,947
575,385
539,618
557,221
409,942
400,573
510,512
539,592
422,046
482,872
505,854
469,908
442,406
530,507
331,818
505,465
333,290
459,706

+108.9%
+ 60.1%
+ 58.2%
+ 46.3%
+ 64.6%
+ 42.5%
+ 63.2%
+ 34.2%
+ 43.1%
+ 38.3%
+ 18.2%
+ 33.9%
+ 18.7%
+ 31.9%
+ 28.6%
+ 44.9%
+ 40.8%
+ 28.8%
+ 36.0%
+ 32.7%
+ 22.9%
+ 18.7%
+ 25.2%
+ 23.9%
+ 13.4%
+ 13.2%
+ 17.1%
+ 14.8%
+ 12.3%
+ 12.8%
+ 9.3%
+ 4.3%
+ 5.4%
+ 7.0%

272,154
237,235
223,387
182,845
290,596
227,692
318,942
236,870
301,172
263,850
265,164
272,220
277,861
303,026
317,973
255,165
350,839
332,844
312,890
277,169
257,242
274,194
342,540
377,406
303,098
375,475
381,602
348,940
353,156
404,695
275,103
463,800
299,156
399,782

-31.0%
-42.5%
-43.6%
-46.3%
-31.4%
-41.3%
-24.5%
-40.1%
-27.2%
-35.2%
-40.0%
-31.4%
-32.9%
-27.70
-28.6-36.97
-- 19.2%
-25.5%
-21.1%
-34.0%
-22.9%
-18.7%
-16.0%
-13.4%
-18.6%
-12.0%
-11.7%
-14.8%
-10.4%
-14.0%
- 9.3%
- 4.3%
- 5.4%
- 7.0%

3.0 to 1
2.8 to I
2.8 to 1
2.7 to I
2.4 to I
2.4 to I
2.2 to 1
2.2 to 1
2.0 to 1
2.0 to 1
2.0 to I
2.0 to 1
1.8 to I
1.8 to 1
1.8 to I
1.7 to I
1.7 to 1
1.7 to 1
1.7 to 1
1.6 to I
1.6 to 1
1.5 to
1.5 to 1
1.4 to 1
1.4 to I
1.3 to 1
1.3 to I
1.3 to I
1.3 to I
1.3 to 1
1.2 to 1
1.1 to I
1.1 to I
1.1 to l

-56.9%

* States which have redistricted since 1960 census.

t States which have gained seats under new apportionment but have not yet redistricted.
...
Figures not yet available for Alabama, Arizona, Masschusetts or Mi.isppi.
92urre: Figures for states which have redistricted on the basis of the 1960 nsus ore taen free varous issueof Congrezs.oal Quaterly Weekly Report. 161 and early 1962. Figures for states which have not redistricted are taken from Congressional Quartcrly Weekly
Report No. 5, Feb. 2, 1962, pp. 168-69.

One by-product, resulting from the juggling of congressional district population
and lines, is the creation of one-party districts, a natural objective of a political party
in control of a state legislature, whether Democrat or Republican. From these
"safe" seats come legislators who need not be as sensitive to the social dynamics of
their day as are other representatives in tightly contested districts. The safe-seat
representative tends to be immunized against change, secure in the knowledge that
he will be returned by the political inertia built into his district. These same representatives are also in the best position to accumulate seniority; hence, to rise in com-
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mittee status and ultimately to chair decisive committees. In this way, the conservative weighting in the United States House of Representatives is even more heavily
weighted in committee posts by the creation of one-party districts.
The relationship between seniority and "safeness" of districts may be seen.by
examining the districts represented by the committee chairmen and ranking minority members in the House of Representatives at the present time (1962). Of the
twenty-one Democratic chairmen, seven have had no Republican opposition in any
of the last five elections (1952-i96o); four others come from districts where the
Democratic vote has not fallen below seventy per cent in any of the five elections;
five others are from districts where the Democratic vote has not fallen below sixty
per cent; three more represent districts in which the Democratic vote has not been
less than 52z/2 per cent; only two are from districts where the Democratic vote has
been less than 52V/ per cent. Of the nineteen ranking Republicans (who would
become chairmen if the GOP became the majority), five are from districts where the
Republican vote since 1952 has never been lower than sixty per cent; nine others are
from districts where the GOP vote has not gone below 52 per cent; only five
represent districts where the Republican vote has fallen under the 52V per cent
mark. 1
Of the twenty-one Democratic chairmen, fifteen are from predominantly rural
districts; six are from predominantly urban or suburban districts. Of the nineteen
ranking Republicans, fifteen are from predominantly rural districts; four are from
predominantly urban or suburban districts. The combined total shows that thirty
of these forty congressmen represent predominantly, rural constituencies.
Since the federal legislature is hardly a model of equity in representation, the
turn to Washington has been the turn to a lesser evil. At the federal level, as at the
state level, the voter has tended to look more and more to the Executive-to the
President of the United States-for leadership. Exactly the same kind of reasons
that impelled the citizenry to turn to the governor impels them to turn to the
President: greater stature, greater visibility, greater personal power vis-a-vis any
single. congressman, and the fact that he is more likely to represent the actual voting
majority in the nation.
This, likewise, is historically paradoxical and almost a reversal of what was
intended. It was the House of Representatives that was to be the more direct and
representative voice of the people. The Senate was originally elected indirectlyoften chosen by state legislatures. The President was elected indirectly, picked by an
electoral college. The form of the electoral college is still preserved, but as things
have worked out in virtually every national election the candidate with the popular
plurality became the President. There have been no exceptions since 1888. The
President of the United States, originally intended to be chosen by remote control,
appears to the man of the street to be his most direct voice in Washington.
Equally ironic is the fact that the Senate, originally the instrument of the less
" Cong. Q. Special Report (Part 2 of Weekly Report No. io), March ro, 196i, pp. 47-51.
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populous and therefore more agrarian states to check the more populous and therefore more industrialized states, is today more responsive to the needs of the twentiethcentury American than is the House of Representatives.
The reasons are double: most of the states have urban majorities; and even in
rural states, the senators-since they are elected at large, with one vote counting for
one vote no matter where the vote comes from-must give ear to the voting bat-

talions of the city.
"The same shift of population which has resulted in state legislatures becoming
less representative of urban areas," writes the Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, "has had the effect of making the United States Senate more representative
of these areas."3

The indirect results of unequal representation upon the shape of American
government smacks of irony and poetic justice. The state legislatures are constantly losing power to the governors, then to the federal government, then to the
Senate, and then to the President of the United States. While the state legislatures
cry ever louder for great power, their power wanes-because their unrepresentative
character makes a mockery of their claims to represent the folks back home. Those
who cry loudest for "states' rights" do the most to destroy them.
The turn of America's urban populations first to the Presidency and then to the
Senate to find a more representative and hence a more responsive ear has, in the
last sixty years, turned the original intent of the Constitution writers topsy-turvy.
This development has also affected the composition and the decisions of the Supreme
Court.
As originally conceived, the Supreme Court was hardly designed to be the direct
creation and servant of the "people." The members of the Court were to be named
by a President (three steps removed from the electorate) and ratified by a Senate
(twice removed from the voters). The Court, then, was at least four times removed
from the direct popular will.
But the sociodynamic pressures, generated by industrialization and urbanization,
that changed the role of President and Senate have also changed the Supreme Court
from a distant and passive arbiter into a representative and active instrument of
social change. The Court is the child of President and Senate-the two great organs
of public policy to which our predominantly metropolitan nation has come to look
for action. Hence, the personnel and policies of the Court have come more to reflect
the attitude of President and Senate than of the state legislatures and their creature,
the House of Representatives.
The urban trek to the courts, state and federal, to seek fair representation is no
recent trend. Before the turn of the century, the basic precedents were laid down
for the right of the courts to intervene and for the extent to which the courts would
intervene. Summarizing this body of precedent, David 0. Walter wrote:39
3' CoMMissioN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RET.IONS, REPoR TO TIE PRESIDENT 40 (1955).
"' Walter, Reapportionment and Urban Representation, Annals, Jan. i 938, pp. x 1-i2.
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In no state has the court denied that it has the power to review on the ground of
failure to observe the constitutional limitations, such legislative action or the districtings
by county boards. In twenty-two states the courts have exercised the power, or specifically
stated that they have the power, to review such acts on the question of equality. There
have been twenty-five cases in which the courts have so acted; in eight of those the acts
were upheld; in seventeen they were invalidated. Since the general principles were laid
down in cases decided between 189o and i9oo there have been no changes in doctrine, but
a few cases every decade call for the application of these principles.
Since then citizens have appealed repeatedly to their state courts to set aside
districtings and apportionments of state legislatures, or to compel %legislativebodies
to act affirmatively. Although state courts have not been reluctant to act-apparently
willing to assume jurisdiction and justiciability-they have not always been able
to devise remedies consistent with their conclusions. "The performance of the
state courts has been especially weak in fashioning remedies for the wrongful refusal of legislatures to reapportion," concluded Anthony Lewis in 1958.4
To the difficulties of the courts in finding feasible remedies was added the judicial
inhibition contained in the opinion of the Supreme Court in Colegrove v. Green
in 1946.41 When the Supreme Court decided not to invalidate an Illinois congressional districting, Justice Frankfurter, in his opinion, went beyond the immediate limits of the case to lay down, some broad guidelines for the courts in dealing
with the total problem of proper representation. His basic admonition to the Court
was to avoid this "political thicket.""2 And in so doing, he made a "political"
decision that, in effect, turned over to state legislatures the unchecked power not
only to frustrate the will of an ever-rising urban-suburban majority but also to
restructure government further to fortify the will of an ever-diminishing rural
minority. In Frankfurter's nonpolitical decision to practice judicial self-restraint in
Colegrooe v. Green, he unleashed political pressures that ultimately compelled
the Court to get into the "thicket' in Baker v. Carr.
Had Colegrove v. Green been followed by state actions-whether by legislatures,
conventions or referenda-to adjust representational inequities, the pressures for
court action would have been eased. But quite the opposite has happened. With
each succeeding decade the urban voter has become increasingly disadvantaged. The
following table shows vote value by counties, assuming that "value would be ioo if
seats in state legislatures were evenly distributed in proportion to county popula43
tions."
VOT VALUE
Counties by Population
1910
1930
-950
196o
500,000 and over
81
74
78
76
xoo,ooo to 499,999
91
84
83
81
25,000 to 99,999
103
lo9
114
123
Under 25,000
113
131
141
171
'°Lcwis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 157, 1o69 (1958).
" Id. at 556.
8* 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
' PAuL T.
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During this same period, the problems, typical of urbanization have grown more
severe as the ratio of city dwellers increased. In i94o, there were 57,245,ooo inhabitants in rural and 74,424,000 in urban areas. By. x96o, rural dwellers had fallen to
54,o54,ooo while urban had risen to 125,269,ooo. 4 The well-noted rise of the suburbs

has not lessened-but intensified-the sociopolitical difficulties. Ourlargest suburbs
are primarily part of expanding urban clusters, faced with all the problems of schools,
housing, traffic, transit, hospitals, clinics, water supply, smoke .control, industrial
relations that characterize the metropolitan complex. Solutions are made more
difficult by the continuance of outmoded city and county lines, with, a variety of
criss-crossing townships, unincorporated areas, authorities, and districts. The rise
of the metropolitan areas as a socioeconomic fact, without the corresponding establishment of metropolitan political configurations, has posed for state legislatures one
of their most demanding challenges, requiring active, creative government. The
continuance of conservative rural control in state legislatures becomes increasingly
as frustrating to the modern suburb as it has been for decades to the older core of the
metropolis.
Where citizens have tried through the use of constitutional channels to change
the existing apportionment, the state legislatures have not hesitated to controvert the
will of the people. In a number of states, the legislature simply refused to enforce
its own constitution, as in the Tennessee circumstances leading up to Baker v. Carr.
In Maryland, the voters approved the calling of a state constitutional convention by an
overwhelming vote, but the general assembly refused to convene the convention
for fear it would revise the apportionment provisions. In Florida, where the constitution calls upon the legislature to sit in special session, if necessary, to reapportion,
the legislature moved to abolish this proviso when it was unable to break a deadlock
with the governor. In Washington, the voters voted reapportionment through
initiative, but when the legislature gathered, it "amended" the initiative statute
beyond recognition. The state supreme court denied a writ of mandamus to compel
the legislature to abide by the initiative statute4 5
During the last two decades, several proposals have been offered in the Congress
of the United States to weaken the status of both the President and the Supreme
Court., A proposed constitutional amendment would have the President chosen by
electors on the basis of one elector per congressional district. By this scheme, the
state legislatures, with power to gerrymander congressional districts, could also
gerrymander the Presidency. Several proposals, have been made to limit the power
of the Supreme Court-by statute or by constitutional amendment; the latest proposal followed immediately on the heels of Baker v. Carr and was,specifically aimed
at curbing the power of the Court in reapportionment. Should these proposals ever
"Figures

for 194o are from U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
14 (ig6o); figures for zg6o, TnE WORLD ALMANAC 255 (x962).
Although the definition of riral-urban has changed between 1940 'and x96o, the basic shift to the
metropolitan centers continues as a fundamental trend.
""Lewis, supra note 40, at 1092.
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become law, then a minority in control of state legislatures could not only weight
the House of Representatives in its favor, but could do the same with the Presidency,
while curbing and coloring the character of the United States ,Supreme Court.
The state legislatures should have been on their guard after Colegrove. Justice
Frankfurter did not condone maldistricting and malapportionment. He termed them
"grave evils" that "offend public morality." He advised judicial restraint because
"the Constitution of the United States gives ample power to provide against these
evils.... This remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures
'
that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress."46
Instead
of reading this statement as a warning, state legislatures interpreted it as a license to
distort and deny the will of the people as expressed through constitutional channels.
It became increasingly evident between 1946 and 1962 that in our system of
checks and balances there is no Jbuilt-in check on the power of the state legislature to
compose itself, and through this power, to influence, perhaps even control, the
character of Congress, President, and Court. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court
moved to restore the balancel
"Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554, 556 (1946).

